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ABSTRACT 
 
Competitive Market Research and Product Design 
by 
WANG Haixiu 
Master of Philosophy 
 
To learn the uncertainty of customer preference on the attribute of new product, usually a 
firm needs to do market research. Developing a product on an attribute which is less 
preferred by customer may lead to a failure. In addition, a firm used to take efforts to 
design the product. In recent years, we observed a new business model in which the firm 
does not take effort to design new product, nor does she do market research by herself. 
She provides rewards to attract outside designers to design new product. Some designers 
may take effort and design products based on their private information of customer 
preference. The firm receives designs with different quality and attribute, she chooses one 
to produce. By solving this game model, we get the equilibrium quality of the design 
offered by each designer based on their private cost parameter. And we obtain the 
following insights: When the market size is too small, the firm gives nothing to designers; 
when the market size is sufficiently big, the firm only gives reward to the designer whose 
design is produced; otherwise the firm gives both rewards to participated designers and 
the designer whose design is produced. We find that when the market size is big enough 
or the disutility is high enough, the new business model dominates the benchmark 
business model. When both the disutility and market size are small enough, the firm 
prefers the benchmark business model. And the relative attractiveness of new business 
model versus benchmark model keeps the same when the market size is small enough. 
The impact of extra reward on relative attractiveness of new business model versus 
benchmark model increases with extra reward. When the extra reward is high enough, the 
firm always prefers the new business model. 
 
Key words: Customer preference; market research; information acquisition; product 
design; quality. 
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1 Introduction
Recent studies nd that failure rate is very high for new products development. Newly
launched products have shown notoriously high failure rates over the years, often
reaching fty percent or more (Piller 2010). Most of these failures can be attributed
to mismatches between customer preferences and the available products. Compared
to technical problems, the poor business prospect leads to unsuccessful new product
development projects. In many industries, customer tastes are inherently uncertain.
Many rms were faced with hard decisions when developing new products. In the
mid-1980s, rms in the disk industry were not sure whether to develop smaller drives
or to increase memory capacity. Seagate and Conner Peripherals were faced with
this dilemma and contemplating where to dedicate R&D e¤ort (Christensen 1997).
In the mid-1990s, a problem emerged in the market of laptops on whether to reduce
weight or to improve the performance of the computer. These two attributes cannot
be satised simultaneously, so Compaq and Toshiba were not sure whether to pursue
sense of beauty by allowing only light and interchangeable peripherals or to o¤er
greater convenience by attempting to internally integrate all the peripherals including
high-performance components (Bell and Leamon 1999). In the early 2000s, rms in
the market of mobile phone were not sure whether to design candy bar or clamshell
styles (The Economist 2004). Nokia and Motorola did not know customerstastes and
had to make a choice between these two attributes. The industry of pharmaceuticals
also faced the problem of di¤erent development directions. For example, Eli Lilly,
Pzer, and Forest were not sure whether to develop antidepressants which can treat
acute depression or co-treat physical pain symptoms associated with mild depression.
Customer preference is always a major factor considered by rms when they develop
new products.
The mismatch with customer preference may have serious consequences. A chal-
lenge for rms in selling is how to match supply with uncertain customer preference.
This leads to a growing demand for uncertainty-resolving information acquisition.
Prior research has found that timely and reliable information on customer preferences
1
and requirements played an important role in successful product development. Con-
ventionally, heavy investments in market research are considered as the main measure
to access this information. Manufacturers in fashion and seasonal goods industries
(e.g., L. L. Bean and Timberland) have invested in sophisticated information acqui-
sition (Fisher et al. 1994). In the examples mentioned earlier, Compaq conducts
market research before development. In Compaqs market research, customers prefer
the convenience of all add-ons integrated internally and better performance instead of
the concept of interchangeability to reduce laptop weight. Presario notebook line was
successfully designed using this information, which garnered dominant market share
shortly after being introduced in 1996. Among cell phone rms, Nokia introduced new
candy bar handsets without conducting extensive upfront market research. It bet on
developing the wrong handset style and lost a signicant share in 2004 to Motorola,
which produced clamshell phones. In the antidepressant case, Lilly did market research
and it revealed that roughly 25% of mildly depressed patients su¤ering from physical
pain. So it pursued a food and drug administration indication for pain in addition to
an indication for depression treatment (Ofek 2006). Before making any decisions, P&G
invests billions of funds for market research, which makes P&Gs customer trends, psy-
chology and preferences very clearly. For example, customers hope clothes can become
more translucent after using washing powder. Investigation departments should con-
vert towards "transparency" through certain technical indicators, like whether to add
bleach, enzyme and so on. The huge customer data helps P&G make decisions. As
we see, changes in customer preference are faster than ever because of the information
explosion nowadays. Market research is very useful to predict customer preference
which helps rms to design new products preferred by the target market.
After obtaining information about customer preference, rms need to work on new
product design. The traditional way of product design is thorough the rms research
and development (R&D) department. And that incurs a R&D cost. Many companies
design products by themselves. For instance, P&G designs many products by itself.
But some other companies use outsourcing to design products.
In recent years we observed a new business model, which can be illustrated by
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the practice of Threadless. Threadless is an online community of artists and an E-
commerce website. Products of Threadless are created by an online community with 2
million artists. Each week, about 1,000 di¤erent designs of clothing and other products
are submitted online. These designs may have di¤erent attributes, for clothing, some
designs are of slim style but some are casual style; some designs are colorful while
some are colorless; some designs may follow the latest fashion trend while some other
designs may stick to classic style. The sta¤ review and select the designs each week,
print them on clothing and other products, and sell them worldwide through the online
store and their only retail store in Chicago. Designers whose design is printed receive
a reward from Threadless. Under this business model, the companys founders sell
about 160-170 thousand T-shirts per month for between $18 and $24 a piece with a
30% prot margin on sales. Since 2006, annual growth continued at more than 150%,
with similar margins. Sales in 2009 hit almost $30 million with prots of roughly $9
million. Threadless has 2 million followers on Twitter and more than 500,000 fans on
Facebook. The companys website has 2.5 million logged visitors in August 2010, a
50% increase over the same month last year. Threadless follows an innovative business
model that allows it to create products without risk and make heavy investments in
market research to acquire customer preferences before production starts.
This business model has one key di¤erence from traditional rms. The rm does not
do market research or take e¤orts to design the product by itself. Outside designers
design new product for it. It just chooses one design and puts it into production.
At the same time, it acquires the information of customer preference through designs
from participating designers. Each design contains the private information of customer
preference. These designers have a better knowledge of customer preference. They are
professional on the industry and always follow the latest fashion information. Their
rich experience could be used in the design. They are loyal fans of the rm. They
have experienced the process many times and know the target customerspreference.
They are closer to customers and have a good network of potential customers. So the
designers understand customers preference better than the rm.
Some other corporations are utilizing this business model. Jovoto is a company
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that acts as a intermediary and executes hundreds of innovation contests every year for
its clients. It connects those who have ideas with those who need them, provides the
necessary tools to make the process entertaining and fair for the creative community
and delivers high quality ideas and design to organizations. It enables large brands to
brainstorm at scale and to solve product design and innovation challenges with more
than 50,000 creative professionals globally.
There are several issues related to this new business model which is worth studying.
When should the rm choose this kind of new business model? The traditional business
model involves market research, focus groups, testing, reworking, and retesting. But
the new business model has become more popular these years. Firms obtain several
benets from this new business model: the competition induced among designers;
risk of failures is shifted to designers; potential wage-rate arbitrage or cost savings.
These potential benets attract more and more rms to try this new business model.
Greenpeace, Coca-Cola, Unilever, Victorinox, Henkel, Nestle, Unicef and many others
have become frequent clients of Jovoto. The global Head of Sales & Marketing SAK at
Victorinox AG said: "The 2012 Limited Edition version of the small Swiss pocket knife
is the most successful and bestselling collection to date". These global leaders decide
to solve their challenges with the talent base of Jovoto, which can give track record
consisting of accelerated innovation, sales growth or generated media buzz. Some high-
tech industries are not suitable for this business model because of high professional
skills. And sometimes companies are not satised with the designs submitted but they
cannot control the designers. So we plan to investigate when the rm should choose
this kind of new business model.
For a given type of innovation problem, what kind of reward structure should
the rm provide? Specically, should the rm provide rewards to every designer or
only the designer whose design is picked? The incentive of designersparticipation is
directly a¤ected by rewards. Four primary motivations for designersparticipation are:
the opportunity to make money, the opportunity to develop ones creative skills, the
potential to take up freelance work, and the love of community (Daren 2010). "Jovoto
o¤ers me the freedom to choose if I want to invest time in a contest and how much time
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I want to invest. Jovoto also provides the opportunity to work with a great community
and to gather valuable contacts and experiences as well," Creative Mind DaHu said.
However, the reward structure could di¤er under di¤erent scenarios. Prior research
has advocated the use of xed reward, or a performance contingent reward can lead to
better solutions, higher seeker-prots and system e¢ ciency. The reward structure of
Betahaus (which cooperated with InnoCentive for co-working environment in 2013) is:
reward some designers. While a rm only gives reward to the designer whose design
is picked by them in many innovation contests in Zhubajie (a famous Witkey website
in China like Innocentive). The reward structure is an interesting issue to study.
Each designer determines the quality independently without knowing othersdeci-
sion. We want to investigate how designers determine the quality of the design. Do
they decide the quality according to their own conditions such as ability and time?
Or they consider the ability of other competitors? Sometimes having many designers
work on an innovation problem simultaneously may lead to a lower equilibrium e¤ort
for each designer, which is undesirable from the perspective of the rm. While an
additional benet of having a large pool of designers is: the rm can benet from a
larger designer population because it obtains a more diverse set of solutions, which may
mitigate and sometimes outweigh the e¤ect of underinvestment from each designer.
P&G received many ideas each year from the Connect+Develop platform. Despite
the fact that it uses some designs from them, many ideas were useless because the
poor quality of some designerssubmission. But Victorinox gets the bestselling design
with a high quality from the innovation contest. Designersquality decision a¤ects the
result signicantly.
Under this new business model, the rm receives designs with di¤erent qualities
and information about customer preference. But how should the rm pick the design?
Some rms focus on the quality of the products, such as UNIQLO. The core com-
petency of UNIQLO compared to other brands with a comparably price is the good
quality. While some other rms such as FOREVER21 focus on customer preference of
the products. The clothes diversication aims at attracting more young people with
di¤erent tastes. Betahaus has chosen the design with the highest quality in the ex-
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ample mentioned before. While in some other examples, the rm always chooses the
design with highest voting or supporting from people, i.e. the rm chooses the one
that matches customer preference most closely. But which is more important: quality
or customer preference? It is interesting to investigate the way the rm chooses the
design.
To answer these questions, we set up the game model and analyze the decisions of
customer, designers and the rm. We also build the benchmark model to study the tra-
ditional business model. By solving and comparing these game models, we will answer
the above questions. Under the new business model, designers do market research and
design the product for the rm. We start from the simple case where only two design-
ers compete with each other. After receiving a private signal of customer preference,
each of them independently decides whether to participate. And they decide on the
attribute and quality if they plan to submit a design. Designers participate when their
prot is greater than their reservation utility. They compete with each other to get
the reward. Higher quality increases the probability to be chosen by the rm but leads
to a higher cost. We get the Pareto-Optimal equilibrium quality. Each participating
designer determines a quality based on their private cost parameter. And the quality
decreases with the cost parameter of each designer. Designers do not participate if the
cost parameter is high enough. We nd that the rm can charge a higher price and sell
more products with higher quality. So it always chooses the design with higher quality.
When the disutility caused by mismatches with customer preference increases, the rm
charges less and sells fewer products. When the market size is small enough, the rm
gives nothing to designers; when the market size is su¢ ciently high, the rm only gives
reward to the designer whose design is produced; otherwise the rm gives rewards to
both participated designers and the designer whose design is produced. When the
benchmark quality is su¢ ciently high, the reward given to the designer whose design
is produced decreases with the benchmark quality, fewer designers participate but the
overall quality increases. While the benchmark quality is su¢ ciently low, the reward
given to the designer whose design is produced increases with benchmark quality, and
more designers participate but the overall quality decreases. However the prot of the
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rm always decreases with the benchmark quality.
Then we consider the general case in which there are more than two designers com-
pete with each other. Compared with the scenario with two designers, the competition
among designers is ercer. There are more designs with di¤erent qualities submitted.
The probability that the rm gets a higher quality increased. We nd that the rm
receives more signals about customer preference. She chooses the design with the
attribute that matches customer preference with a higher probability. The expected
disutility decreases and the demand becomes greater. Then the company can charge
a higher price and get a higher prot at this case. And we nd that the accuracy of
the signals have positive e¤ects on the prot of the rm, too.
Under the traditional business model, the rm does market research and designs
the product by herself. We nd that the accuracy of the information and the prot of
the rm increases with the market size, and the prot increases faster when the market
size is greater. When the disutility of mismatches with customer preference becomes
greater, the rm buys information with a higher accuracy but gets a lower prot. By
comparing these two models, we nd that when the rm has a high R&D cost, the
rm benets from the combination of information and outside design. That means
the rm has a lower prot if it gets the market information by itself while designing
the product by outsourcing. It can have a higher prot by this new business model
in which outside designers design the product and avoid doing extra market research.
When the market size is large enough or the disutility is high enough, the new business
model dominates the benchmark business model. When both the disutility and market
size are small enough, the rm prefers the benchmark business model. And the relative
attractiveness of new business model versus benchmark model keeps the same when the
market size is small enough. The impact of extra reward on the relative attractiveness
of the new business model versus benchmark model increases with extra reward. When
the extra reward is high enough, the rm always prefers the new business model.
This thesis is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the literature review. In
section 3, we present a game model to study how designers do market research and
design product for the rm. In section 4, we consider the simple scenario where there
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are two designers. In section 5, we consider a more general case where there are
more than two designers. In section 6, we analyze the e¤ects of major operational
parameters. In section 7, we study the traditional way of market research and product
design. We build the model and solve the game. In section 8, we compare the two
models and get some insights. We summarize the research ndings in section 9.
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2 Literature review
This thesis is relevant to four streams of literature. There is a literature on market
research. Usually rms need to acquire the market information of customer preference
before R&D. With vertical preference, rms are priori uncertain about which attribute
all customers will value more. With horizontal preference, there are two distinct
segments and each values innovation on only one of the attributes. Lauga and Ofek
(2009) model a duopoly in which ex ante identical rms must decide where to direct
their innovation e¤orts. They nd that the value of market information to a rm
depends on whether the rival is expected to obtain this information in equilibrium. To
learn customer preference, there is a process of information acquisition. Some literature
about information acquisition is also relevant to this thesis too. Guo and Iyer (2010)
examine the interaction between a manufacturers optimal information acquisition and
sharing strategies in a vertical relationship, capturing the impacts of both the exibility
on sequentially control information collection and the exibility in ex post voluntary
sharing. Guo (2009) also investigates the e¤ects of downstream information acquisition
in a strategic channel setting. Some other works about information acquisition are
based on committees such as the trial group. Gerling et al. (2005) study information
acquisition and decision making in committees. Lauga and Ofek (2009) focus on
whether to do market research based on competition of rivals or not. We focus on
the way of market research of a rm. Many papers related with market research
study the uncertainty of market demand, while we study the uncertainty of customer
preference. We consider vertical preference instead of horizontal preference. As to the
information acquisition, some papers consider sequential information acquisition. Our
thesis considers simultaneous information acquisition. And there is no retailer who
may provide information about customer preference in our model.
Other research on new product development is also relevant to our thesis. Some
papers focus on pricing decision. Xiao and Xu (2012) study the impact of royalty revi-
sion on incentives and prots in a two-stage alliance with a marketer and an innovator.
Crama et al. (2008) study how innovators can optimally design licensing contracts
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when there is incomplete information on the licensees valuation of the innovation,
and limited control over the licensees development e¤orts. Some papers focus on cost
reduction during the product development. Levin and Reiss (1988) analyze R&D poli-
cies when the returns to cost reduction are imperfectly appropriable and market struc-
ture is endogenous. Chan et al. (2007) develop a model using dynamic-programming
techniques which explains why rms vary in their R&D project-management policies.
Firms take e¤orts on managing and balancing their R&D pipelines. Papers related to
new product development (e.g. Levin and Reiss (1988)) focus on pricing and cost re-
duction. Xiao and Xu (2012) study the interaction between the rm and retailer. But
our thesis focuses on new product development by outside designers. The rm does
not take e¤orts to design new product. Outside designers compete with each other
and the rm gives rewards to them. Then the rm chooses the best one to produce.
Another stream of literature is about outsourcing and crowdsourcing. Hippel et al.
(1999) investigate the company 3M which innovates with many customers to develop
new products used in surgery. Piller (2006) nds some companies integrate customers
into the innovation process, for example, by soliciting new product concepts from them
and pursuing the most popular of those ideas. This kind of business model di¤ers with
crowdsourcing because designers also provide information about customer preference
at the same time. Terwiesch and Xu (2008) nd in an innovation contest, a rm
(the seeker) facing an innovation-related problem posts this problem to a population
of independent agents (the solvers) and then provides an award to the agent chosen
to provide the best solution. They analyze the interaction between a seeker and a
set of solvers. Hippel et al. (1999) mainly focus on the phenomenon of outsourcing
or crowdsourcing from the perspective of management. While our thesis focuses on
competitive market research and product design based on both a mathematical model
and specic business cases, we consider the business model of Threadless where many
designers may participate. This way is related to outsourcing and crowdsourcing.
They share the similarity that outside designers design the product for the rm. But
the di¤erence is that the rm acquires information about customer preference from
designers at the same time instead of doing market research.
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The last stream of literature is about game theory. Harsanyi and Selten (1988)
achieve a remarkable degree of theoretical unication for game theory as a whole and
provides a deeper insight into the nature of game-theoretic rationality by providing
solutions for all classes of games, both cooperative and noncooperative, and both
those with complete and with incomplete information. Stra¢ n (1993) provides an
introduction to both axiomatic mathematical thinking and the fundamental process of
mathematical modeling. He gives an insight into both the nature of pure mathematics
and the way in which mathematics can be applied to real problems. This thesis focuses
on a game problem. Methods to solve game problem are useful to get the equilibrium.
We learned from literature about game theory and applied it in our specic cases.
Our results contribute to the literature in several ways. Firstly, to the best of our
knowledge, our thesis is the rst to study competitive market research. Most of the
previous papers about market research such as Lauga and Ofek (2009) focus on the
traditional investigation way. But our thesis focuses on the new way of market research.
The rm gives reward to attract outside designers but it does not pay extra payment
for the information it acquires. The target people of market research are di¤erent from
the traditional way too. Firms usually investigate potential customers to know their
preference but in our thesis designers are not only familiar with customer preference
but also professional about the industry. They provide extra professional information
for the rm. Through this way of market research, the rm acquires independent
signals from each designer. It acquires more valuable information. The uncertainty of
market demand is a key research question while we study the uncertainty of customer
preference. We consider vertical preference (Lauga and Ofek 2009). Designers always
design on the attribute that is the same as the signal they received. Through this way
designers can get a higher probability to get the reward.
Secondly, we study market research and product design together. The literature
studies these two research problems separately. Some papers such as Lauga and Ofek
(2009) only study market research. Some papers such as Piller (2011) only study
people who are not employees but who design product for the rm. For example,
some study open innovation, customer innovation, crowdsourcing and outsourcing.
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Market research and product design are independent in some scenarios but in our thesis
they are not. In our study, these two things happen in the same process. Actually
designers nish these two works together while the traditional market research way is
independent from product design. In the traditional way, the rm needs to pay for
these two e¤orts separately, while in our study the rm does not need to pay extra
reward for the information it acquired. We nd that this kind of business model may
help the rm save costs. When the cost of R&D is too high for the rm, this business
model is very helpful.
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3 The model and preliminary analysis
In this section, we consider the new business model where outside designers do market
research and design product for the rm. We present the game model rst.
When customers purchase products, they have preferences on characteristics of the
product. Taking Threadless for example, customers may prefer slim shirt rather than
casual style; customers may prefer colorful shirt rather than colorless style; customers
may like following the latest fashion trend rather than classic style. New product may
have the wrong attributes which is less preferred by customers (mismatch to customer
preference). For example, clothes are casual style but customers actually prefer slim
style. To study customer preference about the product, we assume that there are two
possible states of attributes: a and b. Let S represent the attribute that is actually
preferred by customer. When the new product mismatches the customer preference
there will be a disutility of customers utility. The constant d represents the disutility
caused by mismatching of customer preference.
In addition to di¤erent preference, customers have di¤erent sensitivity to the qual-
ity of new product. Some customers are more sensitive about the quality but some
others are less sensitive. To capture customersheterogeneity with the quality of the
product, we let the variable  which accords with uniform distribution on interval
[0; 1] represent customerssensitivity to the quality of the product. When  is small it
means the customer is more sensitive to the quality, otherwise it means the customer
is less sensitive to the quality. The customer decides whether to buy the new product.
Hence, the utility of a customer is
U = Q  d  p: (1)
The parameter Q is the quality of the product.  is the indicator of the mismatch
to customer preference,  = 1 if the attribute of the product mismatches customer
preference, otherwise  = 0. And p is the price of the product. We assume the
reservation utility of customers is zero: A customer will buy the product if and only
if the utility is greater than zero. Let  denote the market size and D denote the
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demand of the product, then D = Pr(U  0):
LetM denote the total number of designers. Each designer needs to decide whether
to design. Some designers may have incentive to design but some others may not. We
use m (0  m  M) to denote the number of designers who submit a design to the
rm. These m designers need to decide which attribute they will take e¤ort on. There
is common prior belief about customerspreference. We assume that customers prefer
a design on attribute a with probability  2 (0; 1), and customers prefer design on
attribute b with probability 1  , i.e.,
Pr(S = a) = ; Pr(S = b) = 1  :
Every designer will receive a signal about customer preference. Every designer has
private information of customer preference before he decides whether to design. The
community of Threadless is large and active. Some designers with rich experience are
professional on apparel industry and always follow the latest fashion information, which
could be used in the design for Threadless. They have rich experience in designing
the products. Some designers are loyal fans of Threadless, they experience the process
many times and know its target customers preference. They pay attention to past
designs and learn from them. Some others are amateur designers, they may not have
professional knowledge or experience on design. But they are closer to customers and
have a good network of potential customers. They understand customer preference
much better. Some designers may acquire information about the fashion trend online
and hence know better of customer preference. No matter where designers gather the
information of customer preference, they will use the information to design a product
for a higher probability to get the reward. Let Yi represent each signal acquired by
designer i. Each signal Yi is independently generated from the true state S with
probability  2 [0:5; 1]; i.e.,
Pr(Yi = S) = :
Each designer i will update his belief of customer preference after observing Yi: Using
Bayesian rule, the posterior probability after observing the private signal of designer
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i that customers prefer attribute a is
Pr(S = ajYi = a) = Pr(S = a) Pr(Yi = ajS = a)
Pr(S = a) Pr(Yi = ajS = a) + Pr(S = b) Pr(Yi = ajS = b)
=

 + (1  )(1  ) :
Similarly, the posterior probability after observing the private signal that customers
prefer attribute b is
Pr(S = bjYi = b) = (1  )
(1  ) + (1  ) :
When  ! 0:5; Pr(S = ajYi = a) = ; Pr(S = bjYi = b) = 1   . It means signal Yi
provides no additional information beyond the prior belief. Then designer i determines
the attribute based on common prior belief. When  ! 1; Pr(S = ajYi = a) = Pr(S =
bjYi = b) = 1, it means the signal reveals the true customer preference perfectly. Then
designer i determines the attribute based on the signal which is absolutely right.
The rm will browse all of the m designs. There are na designs with attribute a
and nb designs with attribute b. With
m = na + nb; n = na   nb:
After collecting designs from designers, the rm updates her belief on customer pref-
erence. Using Bayesian rule, the posterior probability after receiving m signals that
customers prefer attribute a is
Pr(S = ajna; nb) = Pr(S = a) Pr(na; nbjS = a)
Pr(S = a) Pr(na; nbjS = a) + Pr(S = b) Pr(na; nbjS = b)
=
na(1  )nb
na(1  )nb + (1  )(1  )nanb
=
n
n + (1  )(1  )n :
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Similarly, the posterior probability after receiving m signals that customers prefer b is
Pr(S = bjna; nb) = 1  Pr(S = ajna; nb) = (1  )(1  )
n
(1  )(1  )n + n :
From the probabilities above, we obtain that when  = 0:5, the probabilities that
customers prefer attributes a and b are respectively
Pr(S = ajna; nb) = 
n
n + (1  )n ;
Pr(S = bjna; nb) = (1  )
n
n + (1  )n :
In the rest of this thesis we assume  = 0:5 for ease of exposition. When  6= 0:5
we can analyze the game model in the same approach and get similar results. We
observe that the probability of customer preference is related on the accuracy of the
information  and the number of designs with each attribute.
Let Qi represent the quality of the design of designer i: Assume Qi > q0 when
designer i decides to participate, where q0 is the benchmark quality. It means the
quality of each design should be greater than or equal to a benchmark quality. This
assumption is to consider the interior solution. Furthermore, we assume q0 > 2d
throughout the paper: If the quality is too low, rms are not allowed to sell the
product.
All designers who submit a design will receive a reward ra o¤ered by the rm, which
is to reward their e¤orts on the design and information about the customer preference.
If the designers design is picked by the rm, he will receive another reward rw given
by the rm. The designer whose design is picked by the rm benets from not only
the monetary reward but also honor or experience. Threadless posts the design and
information of the designer on her website. Everyone can browse this information
online. There are 2 million members on the community of Threadless, so this will help
the designer gain reputation and increase exposure in the professional eld. Designers
may get this kind of achievement and satisfaction from the participation. Let r0
represent this kind of additional reward. Each designer also has a cost to design. We
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use a quadratic cost, which has commonly been used in the literature (e.g. Ge et al
2013). The random variable Ki 2 [0; 1] captures the cost of designer i to achieve a
quality. ur is the reservation utility of the designer. Then the prot of designer i is
i = (rw + r0) Pr(his design is picked to produce)  1
2
KiQ
2
i + ra: (2)
The rm receives m designs. Based on the information, the rm determines to
pick one design to produce. We assume that the rm must pick up one design to
produce. Because we nd that at Threadless, she always picks a design to produce
when it starts this activity. Threadless is a famous company in the professional eld.
When this activity is disclosed to designers, if she does not pick a design and give the
reward to designers she will lose her reputation. Then fewer designers will participate
when she starts again. It is not valuable for her to lose her reputation and fans. So she
always chooses one design to produce and rewards the corresponding designer. The
prot of the rm will be zero when she does not receive any designs. Otherwise she
picks a design and determines the price. Then the prot of the rm is
f = pD   rw  mra: (3)
The sequence of events is as follows:
1. The rm determines the rewards rw and ra.
2. Each of the M designers observes a private signal Yi. His random (private)
quality cost parameter Ki is realized. The designer determines whether to participate.
If he participates he needs to decide the attribute ti, and the quality Qi. Then they
submit their designs (ti; Qi) simultaneously. Every participating designer receives a
reward ra:
3. The rm picks a design with attribute s when she receives designs. And she
gives the designer whose design is picked the reward rw; and then sets the price p.
4. Actual customer preference with attribute is realized. Individual customer
chooses whether or not to buy the product. The rm produces to meet the demand.
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4 Analysis with two designers
In this section we consider a market with two designers, i.e., M = 2:We use backward
induction to solve the game model.
4.1 Stage 4: Customers purchase decision
At stage 4, actual customer preference with attribute is realized. Individual customer
buys the product if and only if the utility is non-negative, i.e.,
U = Q  d  p  0:
Then
  d+ p
Q
:
It means customer with  2 [ d+p
Q
; 1] buys the product. So the demand volume equals
D = max



1  d+ p
Q

; 0

:
When d+p
Q
> 1 there is no sales. While we can show the sales is always positive under
the assumption q0 > 2d:
4.2 Stage 3: Firms design choice
At stage 3, the rm receives m designs and needs to pick one from them. Then she
determines the price p. There are three di¤erent scenarios which depend on the number
of participating designers. We analyze these scenarios one by one.
4.2.1 Both designers participate
In this scenario m = 2: The probability with di¤erent (na; nb) and the posterior prob-
abilities of customer preference about both attributes are calculated according to the
expression in previous section. The distribution of probabilities is shown in table 1.
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(na; nb) Probability Pr(S = ajna; nb) Pr(S = bjna; nb)
(0; 2) C02(0:5)
2 = 0:25 (1 )
2
2+(1 )2
2
2+(1 )2
(1; 1) C12(0:5)(0:5) = 0:5
1
2
1
2
(2; 0) C22(0:5)
2 = 0:25 
2
2+(1 )2
(1 )2
2+(1 )2
Table 1 Posterior probabilities when m = 2
The prot of the rm and the price depend on na; nb and s: So let f (na; nb; s)
and p(na; nb; s) denote the prot of the rm and the price under di¤erent values of na;
nb and s. When the rm receives two designs which are both on attribute b: Then the
rm needs to choose one from them. The di¤erence between these two designs is the
quality. So she compares the prots with di¤erent quality, and then chooses the one
with higher prot. The prot of the rm is
p

1  E()d+ p
Q

  rw   2ra
= p
0@1  ( (1 )22+(1 )2  1 + 22+(1 )2  0)d+ p
Q
1A   rw   2ra
=   1
Q
p2 +
Q(2 + (1  )2)  (1  )2d
Q(2 + (1  )2) p  rw   2ra:
The equilibrium price and the corresponding prot are
p(0; 2; b) =
(2 + (1  )2)Q  (1  )2d
2(2 + (1  )2) ;
f (0; 2; b) =
(Q(2 + (1  )2)  (1  )2d)2
4Q(2 + (1  )2)2   rw   2ra:
From the equilibrium we observe that the price increases with the quality, so does the
prot. So the rm chooses the design with higher quality. Similarly, we get the same
equilibrium result when the rm receives two designs which are both on attribute a.
And the rm also chooses the design with higher quality.
When the rm receives one design with attribute a and another design with at-
tribute b; she has to consider both quality and attribute: If she chooses the design with
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attribute a, her prot is
p

1  E()d+ p
Q

  rw   2ra
=   1
Q
p2 +

2Q  d
2Q

p   rw   2ra:
The equilibrium price and the corresponding prot are
p(1; 1; a) =
2Q  d
4
;
f (1; 1; a) =
(2Q  d)2
16Q
  rw   2ra:
We observe that the price and prot increase with the quality. Similarly, when the
rm chooses the design with attribute b we get the same equilibrium result. So when
the rm receives one design with attribute a and another design with attribute b, she
always chooses the design with highest quality no matter which attribute is.
4.2.2 One designer participates
In this scenario m = 1: There are two cases which depend on the value of na and nb.
The distribution of posterior probabilities is shown in table 2.
(na; nb) Probability Pr(S = ajna; nb) Pr(S = bjna; nb)
(0; 1) 0:5 1   
(1; 0) 0:5  1  
Table 2 Posterior probabilities when m = 1
For both cases, the prot of the rm is
p

1  E()d+ p
Q

  rw   ra
=   1
Q
p2 +
Q  (1  )d
Q
p  rw   ra:
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The equilibrium price and corresponding prot are
p(1; 0; a) = p(1; 0; b) =
Q  (1  )d
2
;
f (1; 0; a) = f (1; 0; b) =
(Q  (1  )d)2
4Q
  rw   ra:
We observe that the price and prot increase with the quality. For these two cases,
the rm receives only one design so she has only one choice.
4.2.3 Neither designer participates
In this scenario m = 0: There is no production and the rm collects zero prot.
4.3 Stage 2: Designersparticipation and quality decision
At stage 2, each of M designers observes a private signal Yi. Designer i participates
when his prot is greater than the reservation utility. After receiving the private
signal, every designer decides whether to participate. If he decides to participate, he
determines design on one attribute. There are ve pure strategies of designer i. He
may always designs on attribute a or b no matter what the signal is; he may design
on attribute Yi; he may design on attribute Yi which is opposite with Yi; and he
may do not participate. In conclusion, the possible pure strategies of designer i are
ti 2 fa; b; Yi; Yi;?g: We can easily verify that each designer always designs on the
attribute as the same with his private signal, i.e., ti = Yi:
Each designer decides his quality to maximize his expected prot. And each of
them has a cost for this quality. But designers do not know otherscost parameter,
each of them can only observe his own random (private) quality cost parameter Ki. So
each of them makes the decision of the quality based on their private cost parameter.
So we assume the strategy of designer j is as follows:
1. When the cost parameter of designer j is high, he submits a smaller quality
to reduce his cost. When the cost parameter is low, he submits a higher quality to
get a higher probability to get the reward. So we assume Qj monotonically decreases
with Kj when 0 < Kj  k; k 2 [0; 1] is a constant. Let g(Kj) represent this quality
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expression.
2. When Kj is high enough i.e. k < Kj < k^ (k^ 2 [k; 1] is a constant); Qj will be
smaller than the benchmark quality q0 if designer j still submits quality according to
g(Kj). This conicts with our assumption Q > q0 when designer participates. So we
assume Qj = q0 when k < Kj < k^.
3. When the cost parameter is too high i.e k^ 6 Kj < 1, designer j does not
participate because the cost is too high and he cannot get a positive prot. So we
assume that designer j does not participate when k^ 6 Kj < 1.
We have the conclusion that the rm always picks the design with highest quality
at stage 3. So it means the probability when the design of designer i is produced
equals the probability when his quality is the highest, then the prot of designer i is
i = (rw + r0) Pr(Qi > Qj(kj))  1
2
kiQ
2
i + ra
= (rw + r0)(1 Q 1j (Qi)) 
1
2
kiQ
2
i + ra:
We have the theorem about the equilibrium quality below.
Theorem 1 The equilibrium strategy of designer i is to participate with the equilib-
rium quality
Qi =
s
q20 + 2(rw + r0) ln
k
ki
:
if 0 < ki  k (where k 2 [0; 1]); otherwise he does not participate.
Proof. To nd the equilibrium quality, we calculate the rst-order derivative of the
prot with respect to Qi
di
dQi
=  (rw + r0)
dQ 1j (Qi)
dQi
  kiQi:
Set the rst-order derivative of the prot with respect to Qi equal to zero, and we get
dg 1(Qi)
dQi
=   kiQi
(rw + r0)
:
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Then we get
Q
0
iQi =  
(rw + r0)
ki
:
Solve the di¤erential equation and we get the equilibrium of Qi
Qi =
p
C   2(rw + r0) ln ki:
C is a constant. The boundary solution is the exact solution cover the interval of
ki 2 [0; 1]:We consider the scenario when Ki = k. Under the symmetric situation, the
quality when ki = k is
Qi =
q
C   2(rw + r0) ln k = q0:
We get
C = q20 + 2(rw + r0) ln
k:
Substitute C into the above equilibrium and we get g(ki).
Then we check the equilibrium based on our assumption. Given the strategy of
designer j
Qj =
s
q20 + 2(rw + r0) ln
k
kj
(when 0 < kj  k);
Qj = q0 (when k < kj  k^):
Then we plan to nd the strategy of designer i. When 0 < ki  k; the prot of
designer i is
i = (rw + r0)

1  e
q20+2(rw+r0) ln
k Q2i
2(rw+r0)

  1
2
kiQ
2
i + ra:
The rst-order derivative of the prot with respect to Qi is
di
dQi
= Qie
q20+2(rw+r0) ln
k Q2i
2(rw+r0)   kiQi:
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When the rst-order derivative of the prot with respect to Qi equals to zero, the
solution of the equation is the optimal solution. We get the same equilibrium
Qi =
s
q20 + 2(rw + r0) ln
k
ki
:
So the strategy of both designers at 0 < ki  k is the only equilibrium.
When k < ki  k^; if designer i participates with q0; the prot of designer i is
i(q0) =
1
2
(2  k   k^)(rw + r0)  1
2
kiq
2
0 + ra:
If designer i participates with a higher quality than q0; i.e. q0 + " (" is positive and
close to zero), then the prot of designer i is
i(q0 + ") =

1  e
q20+2(rw+r0) ln
k (q0+")2
2(rw+r0)

(rw + r0)  1
2
ki(q0 + ")
2 + ra:
When " is close to zero, the limitation of the prot is
lim
"!0
i(q0 + ") = (1  k)(rw + r0)  1
2
kiq
2
0 + ra:
Compare the prot i(q0) and lim"!0 i(q0 + "): When k < k^
lim
"!0
i(q0 + ") > i(q0):
So there is no equilibrium if k < k^, because designers always choose a quality which
is little greater than q0. When k = k^
lim
"!0
i(q0 + ") = i(q0):
This is an equilibrium when k = k^. So the optimal solution is the only equilibrium,
and it is Qi = q0 (when ki = k): Then the result follows.
There exist multiple equilibria in the reality which equilibrium will be chosen by
the designer: We use Pareto-optimal equilibrium as a concept: This equilibrium is
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Pareto-optimal if there is no other outcome that makes every player at least as well o¤
and at least one player strictly better o¤. That is, a Pareto-optimal outcome cannot
be improved upon without hurting at least one player.
Theorem 2 The Pareto-optimal equilibrium of designer i is to design with quality
Qi =
s
q20 + 2(rw + r0) ln
2(rw + r0 + ra)
(2(rw + r0) + q20)ki
:
if 0 < ki  2(rw+r0+ra)2(rw+r0)+q20 ; otherwise he does not participate.
Proof. When ki  k; the prot of designer i is zero if he does not participate. But
when he participates with Q (Q  q0); his prot is
i(Q) =

1  ke
q20 Q2
2(rw+r0)

(rw + r0)  1
2
kiQ
2 + ra:
The rst derivative of the prot with respect to Q is
di(Q)
dQ
= kQe
q20 Q2
2(rw+r0)   kiQ:
When the rst-order derivative of the prot with respect to Q equals to zero, the
solution of the equation is the equilibrium solution. So the equilibrium solution is
Q =
s
q20 + 2(rw + r0) ln
k
ki
:
But we can easily observe that Q  q0 because ki  k; which conicts with Q  q0:
So we get Q = q0 and the prot is
i(Q) = (1  k)(rw + r0)  1
2
kiq
2
0 + ra:
To get an equilibrium, the prot when designer i participates must less than the prot
when designer i does not participate, that is
i(Q)  0:
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Then we get
k  1 + ra
(rw + r0)
  kiq
2
0
2(rw + r0)
:
Because k  ki < 1; we get
k  1 + ra
(rw + r0)
 
kq20
2(rw + r0)
:
Then
k  2(rw + r0 + ra)
2(rw + r0) + q20
:
The expected prot of designer i is
i =
Z k
0
[(rw + r0)(1  ki)  1
2
ki(q
2
0 + 2(rw + r0) ln
k
ki
) + ra]dki
= (rw + r0)k   3(rw + r0)
k2
4
 
k2q20
4
+ rak:
The rst-order derivative of the prot with respect to k is
di
dk
= (rw + r0)  3(rw + r0)
k
2
  1
2
kq20 + ra:
When the rst-order derivative of the prot with respect to k equals to zero, the
solution of the equation is the equilibrium solution of k. The solution is
k =
2(rw + r0 + ra)
3(rw + r0) + q20
:
But we get the condition 2(rw+r0+ra)
2(rw+r0)+q20
 k < 1 before: And di
dk
< 0 among this interval,
which means the prot decreases with k in the interval
h
2(rw+r0+ra)
2(rw+r0)+q20
; 1

: So the value
of k when designer i can get the maximum prot is
k =
2(rw + r0 + ra)
2(rw + r0) + q20
:
Then the result follows.
Each designer determines whether to participate based on his cost parameter Ki:
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When Ki is less than
2(rw+r0+ra)
2(rw+r0)+q20
; he participates. And the quality decreases with his
cost parameter. But when his cost parameter is greater than 2(rw+r0+ra)
2(rw+r0)+q20
; the cost is
too high and he does not participate. When ki < k; we get the probability when the
design of designer i is picked by the rm
Pr(his design is picked to produce) = 1  ki:
The probability decreases with his cost parameter. Lower cost parameter increases
the probability when he gets the rewards.
4.4 Stage 1: Firms reward decision
At stage 1, the rm determines the rewards. The rms prot is the expected value at
stage 3, we can get probabilities of di¤erent value of m as follows
Pr(m = 2) = k2 =

2(rw + r0 + ra)
2(rw + r0) + q20
2
;
Pr(m = 1) = C12
k(1  k) = 4(rw + r0 + ra)(q
2
0   2ra)
(2(rw + r0) + q20)
2
:
We got the prots of the rm at stage 3. Then expected prot of the rm is
f = Pr(m = 1)
h
E((Q (1 )d)
2
4Q
)  rw   ra
i
+ 0:5Pr(m = 2)h
E((Q(
2+(1 )2) (1 )2d)2
4Q(2+(1 )2)2 ) + E(
(2Q d)2
16Q
)  2rw   4ra
i
:
Substitute the probabilities into the expression and we get
f =
k(2 k)E(Q)
4
+ kd2E( 1
Q
)
h
k(4(1 )4+(2+(1 )2)2)
32(2+(1 )2)2 +
(1 k)(1 )2
2
i
  dk2(3(1 )2+2)
8(2+(1 )2)   dk(1  k)(1  ) + k(k   2)rw   2kra:
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Note that Q = max(Qi; Qj). The expected quality E[Q] is
E(Q) =
Z k
0
(
Z Ki
0
(
s
q20 + 2(rw + r0) ln
k
kj
)dkj
+
Z 1
Ki
s
q20 + 2(rw + r0) ln
k
ki
dkj)dki
+
Z 1
k
(
Z k
0
s
q20 + 2(rw + r0) ln
k
kj
dkjdki
= 2
Z 2(rw+r0+ra)
2(rw+r0)+q
2
0
0
(1  ki)
s
q20 + 2(rw + r0) ln
2(rw + r0 + ra)
(2(rw + r0) + q20)ki
dki:
The expectation of E[ 1
Q
] is
E(
1
Q
) =
Z k
0
(
Z Ki
0
(
1q
q20 + 2(rw + r0) ln
k
kj
)dkj
+
Z 1
Ki
1q
q20 + 2(rw + r0) ln
k
ki
dkj)dki
+
Z 1
k
(
Z k
0
1q
q20 + 2(rw + r0) ln
k
kj
dkjdki
= 2
Z 2(rw+r0+ra)
2(rw+r0)+q
2
0
0
1  kiq
q20 + 2(rw + r0) ln
2(rw+r0+ra)
(2(rw+r0)+q20)kj
dki:
We test many sets of parameters and nd that the prot function is always jointly
concave function in rewards rw and ra. When  = 0:8; r0 = 10; q0 = 10;  = 50; d = 2;
the prots of the rm with respect to rewards rw and ra are
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Fig 1 Firms prot with respect to reward rw or ra
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We use sequential optimization to show that the prot of the rm is jointly concave
in rewards rw and ra: We get the rst gure by setting a xed value of ra = 10; then
we can nd the optimal reward rw from the concave gure: We nd that the prot
is always concave in rw for any given ra: A series value of rw under di¤erent value of
given ra can be found; then we show the second gure. So we get a sequential optimal
solution of rw; r

a from these two gures: There exists optimal rewards r

w; r

a > 0 which
make the rm get the maximum prot f .
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5 Analysis with more than two designers
In this section we consider the general scenario when there are more than two designers,
i.e. M > 2: We use backward induction to solve the game model. The model and
sequence of events are the same as section 3. And the analysis of stage 4 is the same
as section 4. So we just analyze other three stages in this section.
5.1 Stage 3: Firms design choice
There are M scenarios of the number of participated designers.
m 2 f0; 1; 2; :::;Mg:
For m 2 f0; 1; 2; :::;Mg; the distribution of posterior probabilities is shown in table 3.
(na; nb) Probability Pr(ajna; nb) Pr(bjna; nb)
(0;m) C0m(0:5)
m  m
 m+(1 ) m
(1 ) m
 m+(1 ) m
(1;m  1) C1m(0:5)m 
2 m
2 m+(1 )2 m
(1 )2 m
2 m+(1 )2 m
::: ::: ::: :::
(na;m  na) Cnam (0:5)m 
2na m
2na m+(1 )2na m
(1 )2na m
2na m+(1 )2na m
::: ::: ::: :::
(m  1; 1) Cm 1m (0:5)m 
m 2
m 2+(1 )m 2
(1 )m 2
m 2+(1 )m 2
(m; 0) Cmm(0:5)
m m
m+(1 )m
(1 )m
m+(1 )m
Table 3 Posterior probabilities when M > 2
5.1.1 All designers participate
In this scenario m =M . When the rm receives M designs on attribute b. The rms
prot is
p 

1  E()d+ p
Q

  rw  Mra
=   
Q
p2 +
0@Q   M M+(1 ) M d
Q
1Ap   rw  Mra:
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We get the equilibrium price and corresponding prot
p(0;M; b) =
Q  (1 )M
M+(1 )M d
2
;
f (0;M; b) =


Q  (1 )M
M+(1 )M d
2
4Q
  rw  Mra:
We observe that the prot increases with quality. So the rm chooses the design
with highest quality from M designs. Similarly, when the rm receives M designs on
attribute a, she must choose the design with attribute a. And we get the equilibrium
price and corresponding prot
p(M; 0; a) =
Q  (1 )m
m+(1 )md
2
;
f (M; 0; a) =


Q  (1 )m
m+(1 )md
2
4Q
  rw  mra:
She chooses the design with highest quality from M designs too.
When the rm receives na designs on attribute a and M   na designs on attribute
b; the prot if she chooses the design with attribute a is
p 

1  E()d+ p
Q

  rw  Mra
=   
Q
p2 +
0@Q  (1 )2na M2na M+(1 )2na M d
Q
1Ap   rw  Mra:
We get the equilibrium price and corresponding prot
p(na;m  na; a) =
Q  (1 )2na M
2na M+(1 )2na M d
2
;
f (na;m  na; a) =


Q  (1 )2na M
2na M+(1 )2na M d
2
4Q
  rw  Mra:
We observe that the prot increases with the quality. So when the rm chooses a
design on attribute a she chooses the one with the highest quality. Similarly, when
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she chooses a design on attribute b, the prot is
p 

1  E()d+ p
Q

  rw  Mra
=   
Q
p2 +
0B@Q  
2na M
2na M+(1 )2na M d
Q
1CAp   rw  Mra:
The equilibrium price and corresponding prot are
p(na;m  na; b) =
Q  
2na M
2na M+(1 )2na M d
2
;
f (na;m  na; b) =


Q  
2na M
2na M+(1 )2na M d
2
4Q
  rw  Mra:
We observe that the prot increases with the quality too. So when the rm chooses a
design on attribute b she chooses the one with the highest quality. Hence, when the
rm receives na (na = 1; :::;M   1) designs on attribute a and M   na designs on
attribute b; the rm compares the prot of two designs rst; one is the design with
highest quality on attribute a and the other one is the design with highest quality on
attribute b. Then she chooses the one that maximizes the prot. Let Qa, Qb denote
the highest quality of designs with attribute a and b relatively. Then the di¤erence of
the prot when the rm chooses these two designs is


Qa   (1 )2na M2na M+(1 )2na M d
2
4Qa
 


Qb   
2na M
2na M+(1 )2na M d
2
4Qb
:
The necessary and su¢ cient condition when the di¤erence is greater than zero is
QaQ
2
b  

Qa   (1 )2na M2na M+(1 )2na M d
2
+ 2
2na M
dQa
2na M+(1 )2na M

Qb
+


2na M
d
2na M+(1 )2na M
2
Qa < 0:
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The solution is
Qb >
1
2Qa
(
Qa   (1  )
2na M
2na M + (1  )2na M d
2
+
2
2na M
dQa
2na M + (1  )2na M
 

Qa   (1  )
2na M
2na M + (1  )2na M d
"
Qa   (1  )
2na M
2na M + (1  )2na M d
2
+
4
2na M
dQa
2na M + (1  )2na M
# 1
2
9=; ;
or
Qb <
1
2Qa
(
Qa   (1  )
2na M
2na M + (1  )2na M d
2
+
2
2na M
dQa
2na M + (1  )2na M
+

Qa   (1  )
2na M
2na M + (1  )2na M d
"
Qa   (1  )
2na M
2na M + (1  )2na M d
2
+
4
2na M
dQa
2na M + (1  )2na M
# 1
2
9=; (4):
Because Qb  q0  2d; we rule out the rst condition. So the condition when the rm
chooses the design with attribute a is condition (4). It means when the highest quality
of the design with attribute b is less than the value above, the rm chooses the design
with highest quality on attribute a:
5.1.2 Some designers participate
In this scenario 2 < m < M . The rms prot when she receives m designs with
attribute b is
p 

1  E()d+ p
Q

  rw  mra
=   
Q
p2 +
0@Q  (1 ) m m+(1 ) md
Q
1Ap   rw  mra:
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We get the equilibrium price and corresponding prot
p(0;m; b) =
Q  m
m+(1 )md
2
;
f (0;m; b) =


Q  m
m+(1 )md
2
4Q
  rw  mra:
We observe that the prot increases with the quality. So the rm chooses the design
with highest quality from m designs. Similarly, when the rm receives m designs on
attribute a, she must choose the design with attribute a. And we get the equilibrium
price and corresponding prot
p(m; 0; a) =
Q  (1 )m
m+(1 )md
2
;
f (m; 0; a) =


Q  (1 )m
m+(1 )md
2
4Q
  rw  mra:
The rm chooses the design with highest quality from m designs too.
When the rm receives na designs on attribute a and m  na designs on attribute
b; if the rm chooses the design with attribute a, the prot is
p 

1  E()d+ p
Q

  rw  mra
=   
Q
p2 +
0@Q  (1 )2na m2na m+(1 )2na md
Q
1Ap   rw  mra:
We get the equilibrium price and corresponding prot
p(na;m  na; a) =
Q  (1 )2na m
2na m+(1 )2na md
2
;
f (na;m  na; a) =


Q  (1 )2na m
2na m+(1 )2na md
2
4Q
  rw  mra:
We observe that the prot increases with the quality. So when the rm chooses a
design on attribute a; she chooses the one with the highest quality. Similarly, when
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she chooses a design on attribute b, the prot is
p 

1  E()d+ p
Q

  rw  mra
=   
Q
p2 +
0@Q  2na m2na m+(1 )2na m d
Q
1Ap   rw  mra:
The equilibrium price and corresponding prot are
p(na;m  na; b) =
Q  
2na m
2na m+(1 )2na m d
2
;
f (na;m  na; b) =


Q  
2na m
2na m+(1 )2na m d
2
4Q
  rw  mra:
We observe that the prot increases with the quality too. So when the rm chooses
a design on attribute b; she chooses the one with the highest quality. In conclusion,
when the rm receives na (na = 1; :::;m 1) designs on attribute a and m na designs
on attribute b; the rm compares the prot of two designs rst; one is the design with
highest quality on attribute a and the other one is the design with highest quality on
attribute b. Then she chooses the one that maximizes the prot.
Similarly with the last subsection, when
Qb <
1
2Qa
(
Qa   (1  )
2na m
2na m + (1  )2na md
2
+
2
2na m
dQa
2na m + (1  )2na m
+

Qa   (1  )
2na m
2na m + (1  )2na md
"
Qa   (1  )
2na m
2na m + (1  )2na md
2
+
4
2na m
dQa
2na m + (1  )2na m
# 1
2
9=; (5):
It means when the highest quality of the design with attribute b is less than the value
above, the rm chooses the design with highest quality on attribute a: Hence, when
there are designers participate, the decision of the rm is as follows.
Theorem 3 When all these designers design on the same attribute, the rm chooses
35
the design with highest quality; when some designers design on attribute a but some
others design on attribute b, the rm chooses the design with highest quality on at-
tribute a if Qb is less than the value in expression (5), otherwise she chooses the design
with highest quality on attribute b.
Let f(Qa; na) denote the value of equation (5). We test many sets of parameters
and nd f(Qi; na) follows a same trend. When M = 100; Qi = 50; d = 1;  = 0:8;
f(Qa; na) follows the trend below
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We observe that when M is even and na < M2 ; f(Qa; na) keeps the same low
value, when na > M2 ; f(Qa; na) keeps the same high value. And these two values both
increase with Qa: When na = M2 ; f(Qa; na) = Qa: Combine this observation with the
expression of f(Qa; na); we can approximate f(Qa; na) as follows
f(Qa; na) =
8>>>><>>>>:
Qa   2d+ d2Qa when na < M2 ;
Qa when na = M2 ;
1
2
(Qa + 2d+
p
Q2a + 4dQa) when na >
M
2
:
When Qa is large enough compared to d; we can observe that the high value and low
value are close to Qa. Study the approximation above and we can get the results as
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follows
f(Qa; na) =
8>>>><>>>>:
Qa   2d when na < M2 ;
Qa when na = M2 ;
Qa + 2d when na > M2 :
When na > M2 ; Qa + 2d 
Qa+2d+
p
Q2a+4dQa
2
=  
p
Q2a+4dQa+4d
2 
p
Q2a+4dQa
2
 0: So
the approximation of f(Qa; na) is suitable. It means when na < M2 ; the rm picks the
design with attribute a if the highest quality among designs with attribute b is less
than Qa   2d; when na = M2 ; the rm picks the design with attribute a if the highest
quality among designs with attribute b is less than Qa; i.e. the rm picks the design
with highest quality no matter what the attribute is; when na > M2 ; the rm picks the
design with attribute a if the highest quality among designs with attribute b is less
than Qa + 2d: Otherwise, the rm picks the design with attribute b.
5.1.3 No designers participate
In this scenario m = 0. There is no production and the rm collects zero prot.
5.2 Stage 2: Designersparticipation and quality decision
Now we analyze the behavior of designers. Designers decide whether to participate and
determine the quality if participate. The prot of designer i is the same as expression
(2). But the value of the probability when his design is produced is di¤erent with
subsection 4.3. Refer to the above stage, we analyze the di¤erent cases and get the
choice of the rm.
When designer i designs on attribute a; there are M   1 cases for other designers.
There are na   1 designers design on attribute a and M   na designers design on
attribute b: When designer i designs on attribute b, it is similar because we assumed
 = 0:5: We get the distribution of the probability when the design of designer i is
picked by the rm in table 4.
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na   1 nb Pr(design of designer i is picked)
0 M   1 C0M 1(0:5)M 1(1  g 1(f(Qi; na)))M 1
::: ::: :::
na   1 M   na Cna 1M 1 (0:5)M 1(1  g 1(Qi))na 1(1  g 1(f(Qi; na)))M na
::: ::: :::
M   1 0 CM 1M 1(0:5)M 1(1  g 1(Qi))M 1
Table 4 Probabilities when the design of designer i is picked
So the probability when the design of designer i is picked to produce is
M 1X
na 1=0
Cna 1M 1 (0:5)
M 1(1  g 1(Qi))na 1(1  g 1(f(Qi; na)))M na :
The prot of designer i is similar with the scenario when M = 2. To nd the equi-
librium quality of designer i, we calculate the rst-order derivative of the prot with
respect to Qi
di
dQi
=  (rw + r0)
M 1X
na 1=0
Cna 1M 1 (0:5)
M 1[(na   1)(1  g 1(Qi))na 2
(1  g 1(f(Qi; na)))M na dg
 1(Qi)
dQi
+ (M   na)(1  g 1(Qi))na 1
(1  g 1(f(Qi; na)))M na 1dg
 1(f(Qi; na))
dQi
]  kiQi:
We can observe that g 1(Qi) is corresponding to ki; g 1(f(Qi; na)) is a function on ki:
Set the rst-order derivative of the prot with respect to Qi equal to zero, Then we
have
(0:5)M 1
PM 1
na 1=0C
na 1
M 1 (1  g 1(Qi))na 2(1  g 1(f(Qi; na)))M na 1[(na 1)
(1  g 1(f(Qi; na))) + (M   na)(1  g 1(Qi))g
0 1(f(Qi; na))]
dg 1(Qi)
Ki
=   QidQi
(rw+r0)
:
Because we assumed that Qj decreases with kj, and combined the equation when
38
M = 2 we get the estimated value of g 1(f(Qi; na)) is
g 1(f(Qi; na) ) =
8>>>><>>>>:
g 1(Qi) +  when na < M2 ;
g 1(Qi) when na = M2 ;
g 1(Qi)  when na > M2 :
 is a constant. Then we can get the expression below
g 1(Qi + 2d )  g 1(Qi) =  .
Our approximation is under the assumption when Qi is far greater than d; so we get
g0 1(Qi) =
g 1(Qi + 2d )  g 1(Qi)
2d
=
 
2d
:
We know that g0 1(Qi) = 1g0(ki) : Then we need to show g
0(ki) =  2d :
While we can get the exact equilibrium quality when  = 0:5: Because f(Qi; na) =
Qi for all na under this scenario: The exact equilibrium quality is
Qi =
vuutq20 + 2(rw + r0)(M   1)[M 3X
j=0
CjM 2
( k)M 2 j   ( ki)M 2 j
M   2  j + ln(
k
ki
)]:
Then we get the equation about k as follows
(rw + r0)(1  k)M 1   1
2
kq20 + ra = 0:
We nd that k keeps the same value when M is su¢ ciently large. Combining this
equation we can ignore the part (rw + r0)(1  k)M 1; then we get
k  2ra
q20
39
The rst-order derivative of the g(ki) is
g
0
(ki) =
(rw + r0)(M   1)[
PM 3
j=0 C
j
M 2( ki)M 3 j   1ki ]q
q20 + 2(rw + r0)(M   1)[
PM 3
j=0 C
j
M 2
( k)M 2 j ( ki)M 2 j
M 2 j + ln
k
ki
]
:
The part of summation contains  ki; the summation is a small value because the
positive parts and negative parts nearly cancelled out. So we get
g
0
(ki)   (rw + r0)(M   1)
kiq0
:
So the value of  is
 =
2dq0ki
(rw + r0)(M   1) 
dq0
(rw + r0)(M   1) :
We have the approximation because the mean of ki is 0.5.
Substitute this into the left side of the equation and we get
(0:5)M 1
Ki
fPM2  1na 1=0Cna 1M 1 [(na 1)(1  ki)na 2(1   g 1(Qi))M na+ 2dq0(rw+r0)(M 1)
(M   na)(1  g 1(Qi))na 1(1   g 1(Qi))M na 1]+
PM 1
na 1=M2 +1
Cna 1M 1 [(na 1)
(1  g 1(Qi))na 2(1 +   g 1(Qi))M na+ 2dq0(rw+r0)(M 1)(M   na)(1  g
 1(Qi))
na 1
(1 +   g 1(Qi))M na 1] + (M   1)C
M
2
 1
M 1 (1  g 1(Qi))Mgdg 1(Qi):
Get the integral of the left side of the equation and denote it as h(ki)
h(ki) = (0:5)
M 1f
M
2
 1X
na 1=0
Cna 1M 1
Z
(1  ki)na 1(1   ki)M na
k2i
dki
+
M 1X
na 1=M2 +1
Cna 1M 1
Z
(1  ki)na 1(1 +   ki)M na
k2i
dki
  (M   1)C
M
2
 1
M 1 [
M 2X
j=0
CjM
( Ki)M j
M   j +Mki   ln ki]g:
So we get the equilibrium quality
Qi =
p
C   2(rw + r0)h(ki):
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Similarly with the scenario M = 2; when ki = k
Qi =
q
C   2(rw + r0)h(k) = q0:
So we get
C = 2(rw + r0)h(k) + q
2
0:
Substitute C into the interior solution. Given the strategy of designer j is
Qj =
8><>:
p
q20 + 2(rw + r0)(h(
k)  h(kj)) (when 0 < kj  k);
q0 (when k < kj  k^):
When 0 < ki  k; the prot of designer i is
i = (rw+r0)
M 1X
na 1=0
Cna 1M 1 (0:5)
M 1(1  g 1(Qi))na 1(1  g 1(f(Qi; na)))M na
 1
2
kiQ
2
i+ra:
The rst-order derivative of the prot with respect to Qi is
di
dQi
=
d[
PM 1
na 1=0C
na 1
M 1 (0:5)
M 1(1  g 1(Qi))na 1(1  g 1(f(Qi; na)))M na ]
dQi

(rw + r0)  kiQi:
When the rst-order derivative of the prot with respect to Qi equals to zero, the
solution of the equation is the optimal solution. We get
d[
PM 1
na 1=0C
na 1
M 1 (0:5)
M 1(1  g 1(Qi))na 1(1  g 1(f(Qi; na)))M na ]
ki
=
QidQi
(rw + r0)
:
It is easily to nd that this equation is the same as the process of getting the equilibrium
quality. So we get the same equilibrium with the optimal quality.
When k < ki  k^; it is similar with the scenario when M = 2. So the optimal
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solution is the only equilibrium, and it is as follows
Qi = q0 (when ki = k):
When ki  k; then the prot is zero when designer i does not participate. To get
an equilibrium, the prot when designer i participates with q0 must no more than the
prot when designer i does not participate. When the prot equals to zero we can get
the equilibrium value of k from the equation below
(rw+r0)
M 1X
na 1=0
Cna 1M 1 (0:5)
M 1(1  k)na 1(1  g 1(f(q0)))M na 
1
2
kq20+ra= 0:
The value of k depends on rw; r0; ra; M; q0 and d: When there are more than two
designers, the equilibrium quality of designer i is
Qi =
q
q20 + 2(rw + r0)(h(
k)  h(ki)) (When 0 < ki < k).
We test many sets of parameters and nd k follows the same trend. When ra = 10;
r0 = 10; q0 = 10; rw = 10; d = 1; we get the gure of k with respect to M
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Fig 3 k with respect to M
We observe that when there are enough designers participate, the value of k keeps
the same. Next we test and verify the equilibrium quality under this assumption: We
get the gure of g(kj) when rw = 10; ra = 0; r0 = 10; q0 = 10; M = 10; d = 1
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Given the strategy of designer j above, then designer i maximizes his prot. We
tested many sets of parameters and nd our approximation is appropriate. The prot
of designer i with respect to his quality when r0 = 10; q0 = 10; M = 10; d = 1;  = 0:8
is
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Fig 5 The prot of designer i with respect to his quality
We observe that the optimal quality is 43.22, and we get the corresponding optimal
quality from the equilibrium is 43.13. The error is about 0.2%, it is small enough. And
the corresponding error of the prot is very small too. We test a series value of quality
under di¤erent parameters, and get the estimation error between the exact equilibrium
quality and the estimated equilibrium quality. The estimation error of the quality is
shown in gure 6.
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Fig 6 Estimation error of the quality
We observe that the error is small for reasonable quality. All the errors under
the set of parameters are small than 1.5%. And the error decreases with the qual-
ity. The estimation error is less than 0.5% when the quality is high enough, so our
approximation is reasonable.
5.3 Stage 1: Firms reward decision
In the rst stage, the rm determines the rewards. We can get probability of the value
of m
Pr(na + nb = m) = C
m
M
km(1  k)M m:
So the expected prot of the rm is
f = 
M
m=1C
m
M
km(1  k)M mmna=0Cnam (0:5)m  [ rw mra+
maxE
0B@(Qa   (1 )2na m2na m+(1 )2na md)2
4Qa
;
(Qb   
2na m
2na m+(1 )2na m d)
2
4Qb
1CA
375 :
The corresponding cost parameter of Qa; Qb are Ka; Kb: And Qi decreases with Ki;
so Pr(Ka > Ki) = Pr(K1 > Ki) Pr(K2 > Ki)   Pr(Kna > Ki) = (1   Ki)na : Then
Pr(Ka < Ki) = 1  (1 Ki)na : So the expectation is
E(Qa) =
Z k
0
(1  (1 Ki)na)
q
q20 + 2(rw + r0)(h(
k)  h(Ki))dKi:
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Similarly,
E(Qb) =
Z k
0
(1  (1 Ki)M na)
q
q20 + 2(rw + r0)(h(
k)  h(Ki))dKi:
Similar with subsection 4.4, we test many sets of parameters that meet the as-
sumptions and nd that the prot function is always a concave function in rw and ra
when the parameters meet our assumptions. We can get a sequential optimal solution
of rw; r

a from numerical tests: There exists optimal rewards r

w; r

a > 0 which make
the rm get the maximum prot f . To study what kind of rewards the rm gives, we
test many sets value of  and get the corresponding reward ra; r

w and the prot 

f :
And we nd the rewards keep a same structure with the market size. When  = 0:8;
d = 2; r0 = 10; q0 = 10; M = 2; ur = 0; we get the data shown in table 5.
 1 5 10 20 30 50 100 1000 10000
ra 0:00 0:00 2:00 4:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00 0:00
rw 0:00 0:00 0:00 18:00 52:00 120:00 400:00 41000 1 106
f 0:193 0:96 2:01 8:95 26:33 89:51 389:76 40758 3:05 106
Table 5 The value of ra; r

w and 

f under di¤erent market size
This rewards structure is robust under di¤erent parameters. When the market size
is small enough i.e.  = 1; 5, the equilibrium rewards are both zero. The demand is
too small. If the rm gives reward to designers she may lose money. So no designer
receives reward under this scenario. When the market size is more large i.e.  = 10,
the rm gives reward to all participated designers to thank for their participation but
gives no reward to the designer whose design is picked by her. The reward given
to all participated designers is small compared to the reward given to the designer
whose design is picked. The rm can a¤ord this part of reward under this scenario.
Through this way, the rm can attract more designers to participate and acquire more
information about customer preference. Then the rm has a higher prot than the
scenario when she gives nothing to designers. When the market size reaches higher i.e.
 = 20, the rm gives both rewards to participated designers and the designer whose
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design is picked. Under this scenario, the demand is high so the rm has greater ability
to provide both rewards. And these rewards improve information of customer and the
quality. While the market size is large enough i.e.  = 30; 50; 100; 1000; 10000, the
rm only gives reward to the designer whose design is picked by her. Because the
demand is high enough and the rm is condent about the sales. The e¤ect of the
participated designers is less important to the rm. They only provide information
about customer preference. And the reward given to the designer whose design is
picked already improves the quality. And this reward increases with the market size.
Under this scenario, the e¤ect of market size is more important than other parameters.
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6 Sensitivity analysis
In this section we analyze the impacts of operational parameters to the decisions (the
price and rewards) and prot of the rm. The operational parameters are: number of
designers M , benchmark quality q0; market size ; accuracy of signal ; the reward r0
and the disutility d: We study these impacts one by one.
6.1 The impact of M
We can analyze the impact of the number of designers M by referring the analysis in
section 5. First we analyze the impacts to the price. Then we analyze the impacts to
the rewards. At last we analyze the impacts to the prot of the rm.
When all designers participate and all designs are designed on attribute b or a, the
price increases with M: Because when there are more designers and they all design
on the same attribute; the expected disutility decreases. This can be explained by
the posterior probability of the customer preference. When there are more designers
and they have the same decision on the attribute, the accuracy of the judgment about
customer preferences increases. So the product reduces the risk of mismatch with
customer preference. Then the rm can charge a higher price.
When some designers design on attribute a but some others design on attribute b,
we observe that when na = M2 (i.e. each half of the designers design on attribute a
and b), the expected disutility of attribute a and b are the same. And the price is not
a¤ected by the total number of designers at this scenario. The number of designers
does not a¤ect the match of the product to the customer at this scenario. So the rm
sets the same price for any number of designers.
When na > M2 ; the expected disutility of attribute a is smaller than the expected
disutility of attribute b: If the rm chooses the product with attribute a; the price
increases with M . Because at this scenario, the more designers means more designers
design on attribute a relatively and this decreases the disutility. So the rm charges
a higher price. If the rm chooses the product with attribute b; the price decreases
with M . Because at this scenario, the more designers means less designers design on
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attribute b relatively and this increases the disutility. So the rm charges a lower price.
When na < M2 ; the expected disutility of attribute a is greater than the expected
disutility of attribute b: If the rm chooses the product on attribute a; the price
decreases with M . Because at this scenario, the more designers means less designers
design on attribute a relatively and this increases the disutility. So the rm charges a
lower price. If the rm chooses the product with attribute b; the price increases withM .
Because at this scenario, the more designers means more designers design on attribute b
relatively and this decreases the disutility. So the rm charges a higher price. Similarly,
the impacts are the same for the scenario when there are some designers participate.
Because the more designers, the greater probability that more designers participate.
In conclusion we have corollary below.
Corollary 1 If all designs have the same attribute the rm can charge a higher price
with more designers; if there are designs with attribute a and b; then the price increases
with the number of designers if the rm chooses the attribute which is chosen by most
designers, the price decreases with the number of designers if the rm chooses the
attribute which is chosen by least designers.
The number of designers also has e¤ects on the rewards rw and r

a: When  = 0:8;
d = 2;  = 50; r0 = 10; q0 = 10; rewards rw and r

a with respect to M are
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Fig 7 Sensitivity of rewards rw and r

a with respect to M
We can nd that the optimal rewards rw and r

a decrease with M . When there
are more designers, the rm can acquire more information about customer preference.
The product matches customer preference with higher probability. And the rm has
greater probability to receive higher quality, which increases the demand. So there is
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no need to provide more rewards to attract designers. And when there are enough
designers, the rm gives no reward to all participated designers because there is no
need to encourage more designers to participate. While the marginal e¤ect to reward
rw decreases with the number of designers.
Refer to expression (4), when  = 0:8; d = 2;  = 50; r0 = 10; rw = 10; ra = 0;
q0 = 10; the prot with respect to M is
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Fig 8 Sensitivity of rms prot respect to M
We observe that the prot increases with M . More designers increase the oppor-
tunity of the rm to produce a product which matches customer preference closer and
with a higher quality. In conclusion, we have the observation below.
Observation When there are more designers participate, the rm gets a higher
prot while gives lower rewards to the designers.
6.2 The impact of 
According to the expression of the price under di¤erent scenarios, we observe that the
market size  has no e¤ects on the price. The price is only a¤ected by the quality and
the expected disutility.
As to the e¤ect on the rewards rw and r

a; we can observe from table 5 and get the
gures
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Figure 9 Sensitivity of rewards rw and r

a with respect to 
We observe that the reward rw increases with the market size. When the market
size is greater, the rm can make more prots because of higher demand, she has the
incentive to give more rewards to designers. And this will let the designers have more
motivation to submit a design with higher quality. So the rm can benet from giving
a higher reward rw. While the rm gives higher reward r

a to all designers participated
to thank for their participation when the market size is low enough. Through this
way, designers have more incentive to participate and provide more information. But
when the market size is large enough, the rm gives lower reward ra to participated
designers. Because the great market size already ensures high sales. The e¤ect of
information and quality becomes less important. So she does not need to give reward
to every participated designer. The corresponding prot of the rm with respect to 
is
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Fig 10 Sensitivity of rms prot with respect to 
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We observe that the prot increases with the market size. The demand D =


1  d+p
Q

is always increasing with : So the expected prot of the rm increases
with market size: In conclusion, we have the observation below.
ObservationWhen the market size becomes greater, the rm gives a higher reward
to the designer whose design is picked. The rm gets a higher prot. But the reward
given to all designs is concave in market size.
6.3 The impact of q0
Higher benchmark quality leads to less designersparticipation, then less information
could be acquired by the rm. But there is higher probability to receive a higher
quality. So the benchmark q0 has positive e¤ect on the price when it is low enough,
when q0 is higher the quality of all the designs becomes higher, and then the rm can
charge a higher price. While the benchmark quality is high enough, less information
may lead to mismatch to customer preference. Then the expected disutility is higher
and the rm charges a lower price.
When  = 0:8; d = 2;  = 50; r0 = 10; ra = 10; M = 2; rewards rw and r

a with
respect to q0 are
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Figure 11 Sensitivity of rewards rw and r
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When the benchmark quality is su¢ ciently high, both rewards decrease with the
benchmark quality. The benchmark quality stops some designers with high cost pa-
rameter to participate. They cannot a¤ord to give a quality greater than the high
benchmark quality. Then the rm will lose more information about customer prefer-
ence. This increases the risk of mismatch to customer preference. So the rm gives
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lower rewards to designers. While the benchmark quality is su¢ ciently low, the re-
wards increases with benchmark quality. This attracts more designers to participate.
The rm can benet from more information about customer preference. The corre-
sponding prot of the rm is
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Figure 12 Sensitivity of rms prot with respect to q0
While the prot of the rm always decreases with the benchmark quality. Higher
benchmark quality leads fewer designers to participate. Less information about cus-
tomer preference hurts the rms prot. In conclusion, we have the observation below.
Observation When the benchmark quality is su¢ ciently high, the price and re-
wards given to the designers decrease with the benchmark quality. When the benchmark
quality is su¢ ciently low, the price and rewards increase with benchmark quality. While
the prot of the rm always decreases with the benchmark quality.
6.4 The impact of 
The accuracy of signals acquired by designers has positive e¤ect on the price. The
disutility becomes smaller when the signals are closer to the true customer preference.
Then the rm can charge a higher price when the signals are more accurate. We have
the corollary below.
Corollary 2 When the accuracy of information becomes greater, the rm charges a
higher price.
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When d = 2;  = 15; r0 = 10; q0 = 10; M = 10; rewards rw and r

a with respect to
 are
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Fig 13 Sensitivity of rewards rw and r
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We observe that the optimal reward ra always increases with the accuracy of the
information: Because when the accuracy increased, the value of the designersinforma-
tion increased. The rm can benet from a higher matching with customer preference.
So the rm should give higher reward to attract designers give this information to her.
Otherwise the rm cannot get more valuable information with a smaller reward. While
the accuracy of the information is high enough, the rm gives lower reward to the de-
signer whose design is picked. Under this scenario, the rm already benets enough
from the information she acquired and there are enough designers participate. So she
does not waste money on the only designer. The corresponding prot with respect to
 is
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Fig 14 Sensitivity of rms prot with respect to 
We observe that f increases with : Because when the accuracy of the information
acquired by designers increases, the probability of mismatch is smaller. So the prot
will be higher. In conclusion, we have the observation below.
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Observation When the accuracy of information becomes greater, the rm always
gives a higher reward to all participated designers, and the rm always gets a higher
prot. When the accuracy of information is low enough, the rm gives higher reward to
the designer whose design is picked, while gives lower reward to him when the accuracy
is high enough.
6.5 The impact of d
The disutility caused by mismatch of customer preference has negative e¤ects on the
price. When the disutility is high enough, the customer may not buy the product if
the price is high. The customer will buy the product if and only if the price is low
enough to make the utility of customer greater than zero. When the disutility is low,
the rm can charge a high price that ensures the customer still buy the product. So
the price decreases with the disutility. We have the corollary below.
Corollary 3 When the disutility caused by mismatch of customer preference becomes
greater, the rm charges a lower price.
As to the e¤ect on the rewards rw and r

a, when  = 0:8;  = 20; r0 = 10; q0 = 10;
M = 2; rewards rw and r

a with respect to d are
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We observe that when the disutility is low enough, the rm gives higher reward to
the designer whose design is picked. The rm hopes get more information and higher
quality to increase the demand and counteract the negative e¤ect of the disutility.
While both rewards rw and r

a decrease with the disutility when the disutility is high
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enough. Under this scenario, the demand is lower, rewards hardly counteract the
negative e¤ects and cost the rm too much. So the rm gives lower rewards. The
corresponding prot is
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Fig 16 Sensitivity of rms prot with respect to d
The prot of the rm decreases with the disutility. Higher disutility leads to lower
demand and price. In conclusion, we have the observation below.
Observation When the disutility of mismatch to customer preference becomes
greater, the rm gives lower reward to all participated designers and gets lower prot.
When the disutility is low enough, the reward given to the designer whose design is
picked increases with the disutility. But when the disutility is high enough, the reward
given to the designer whose design is picked decreases with the disutility.
6.6 The impact of r0
The price increases with the extra reward r0. When the reward r0 is higher, designers
are willing to submit a higher quality. Then the rm receives a higher quality and she
can charge a higher price. We have the corollary below.
Corollary 4 When the extra reward becomes greater, the rm charges a higher price.
When  = 0:8; d = 2;  = 30; q0 = 10; M = 2; rewards rw and r

a with respect to
r0 are
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Fig 17 Sensitivity of rewards rw and r

a with respect to r0
We observe that the reward rw decreases with r0: Because when the designer whose
design is picked get a higher extra reward r0; he can accept a lower reward rw from
the rm respectively. The rm has no need to give high rewards to him. Higher
extra reward helps the rm get a higher prot. While the reward which is given to
all participated designers increases with extra reward when it is low enough. The rm
needs to encourage designers to participate when they are not expected to receive high
extra reward. But the reward which is given to all participated designers decreases
with extra reward when it is high enough. Similarly, the rm has no need to give high
rewards because designers may receive high enough reward from the participation.
The corresponding prot is
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Fig 18 Sensitivity of 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t with respect to r0
And we observe that the prot of the rm increases with r0:When designers obtain
higher reputation or experience from the process of participation, it means they have
more incentive to participate and have a higher prot. So they give a higher quality to
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the rm, the rm can get a higher prot with the same reward given to the designer
whose design is picked. The non-pecuniary reward helps designers gain honor in the
professional industry. Some new designers cherish this kind of opportunity to exposure
to the industry. They can gain more experience and learn from the professional de-
signers. So this kind of benets helps improve the quality of designs and increase the
prot of designers as well as the rm. In conclusion, we have the observation below.
ObservationWhen the extra reward r0 is higher, the rm gives lower reward to the
designer whose design is picked. While the reward given to all participated designers
increases with the extra reward rst but then decreases. When the extra reward r0 is
higher, the rm gets a higher prot.
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7 Benchmark
In this section, we consider a game problem that the rm takes e¤ort to do market
research and design the product. We build the model of this game.
7.1 The model
There are only the rm and customer under this business model. Customer decides
whether to buy the new product. The utility of a customer is the same with the new
business model. In the benchmark model the rm takes e¤ort to do market research,
the cost parameter is ka. She determines to buy the information about customer
preference as a whole with accuracy  > 0:5: Higher accuracy helps the rm match
customer preference more accurately but costs more, while lower accuracy helps save
cost but increases the risk of mismatch with customer preference. And she also takes
e¤ort to design the product with a cost parameter kf . We use quadratic cost to model
these two costs. Then the prot of the rm is
f = pD   1
2
kfQ
2   1
2
ka(   0:5)2:
The sequence of events is as follows:
1. The rm determines to acquire information with accuracy .
2. The rm decides the attribute s, quality Q and the price p.
3. Customersactual preference with the attribute realizes. Individual customer
chooses whether or not to buy the product. The rm produces to meet the demand.
7.2 Analysis
We use backward induction to analyze the above multistage game. Stage 4 is the same
as section 4.1, so we start from stage 3.
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7.2.1 Stage 2: Firms quality, attribute and price decision
At stage 2, the rm sets the price to maximize her prot. The prot is
p(1  E()d+ p
Q
)   1
2
kfQ
2   1
2
ka(   0:5)2:
The equilibrium price and corresponding prot are
p =
Q  E()d
2
;
f =
(Q  E()d)2
4Q
  1
2
kfQ
2   1
2
ka(   0:5)2:
The rm chooses the attribute s and decides the quality Q to maximize her prot.
The prot is
(Q  E()d)2
4Q
  1
2
kfQ
2   1
2
ka(   0:5)2 :
After acquiring information about customer preference, the rm decides to design on
which attribute. Let Y represent the attribute acquired from the information. Y is
the opposite attribute with the signal. Similar with the choice of outside designers in
the new business model, she has ve possible choices s 2 fa; b; Y; Y ; ?g. We can
easily observe that the prot of s = Y is the largest one. So the rm always chooses
the attribute which exactly the same with the signal. The prot of the rm is
(Q2   2dQ(1  ) + (1  )d2)
4Q
  1
2
kfQ
2   1
2
ka(   0:5)2.
Then the rm determines the quality to maximize her prot. We have the theorem
below.
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Theorem 4 The equilibrium quality is
Q =
1
12kf
8>><>>:
2
3
r
3 + 12kfd
p
3
q
108(1  )2d2k2f   2(1  )  216(1  )d2k2f
+
3
r
3 + 12kfd
p
3
q
108(1  )2d2k2f   2(1  )  216(1  )d2k2f + 
)
:
Proof. The rm determines the quality to maximize the prot. Get the rst-order
derivative of the prot with respect to quality
df
dQ
=
(Q2   (1  )d2)
4Q2
  kfQ:
When the rst-order derivative equals to zero, we can get the equilibrium quality.
Then we get the equation
4kfQ
3   Q2 + (1  )d2 = 0:
Solve the equation and we get the theorem above.
7.2.2 Stage 1: Firms information accuracy decision
At stage 1, the rm determines to buy the information with accuracy : The expected
prot of the rm is
(Q   (1  )d)2
4Q
  1
2
kfQ
2   1
2
ka(   0:5)2:
We get the rst-order derivative of the prot with respect to  and set it to zero. Solve
the equation and we can get the equilibrium : We test many sets of parameters and
take a set parameter for example: kf = 0:5; ka = 1000;  = 100; d = 2; the prot of
the rm with respect to  is
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Fig 19 Firms prot with respect to 
We observe that rms prot increases with the accuracy of the information rst.
More accurate information benets the rm by matching customer preference perfectly.
It costs too much to improve the accuracy when the information is accurate enough. So
the prot of the rm decreases with the accuracy of the information when the accuracy
is high enough. And she determines an optimal cost and gets the information about
customer preference with corresponding accuracy.
7.3 Sensitivity analysis
7.3.1 The impact of 
According to the expression of the quality, it increases with the market size. When the
market size is smaller, the rm will provide a smaller quality. She bears a higher e¤ort
cost respectively under this scenario. But she prefers to provide a higher quality when
the market size is greater because of large sales. Then she can get a higher prot. We
observe that the market size has the same e¤ects on the price. When the market size
is small, she cannot charge a high price because no one wants to pay too much to buy
a product with poor quality. But she can charge a higher price when the market size
is greater. She has product with good quality to attract customers. Then we have the
observation below.
Observation When the market size becomes greater, the rm provides a higher
quality and charges a higher price.
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The market size has great e¤ects on the accuracy of information and prot of the
rm. When kf = 0:5; ka = 1000; d = 2; the accuracy of the information and rms
prot with respect to  are
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Figure 20 Optimal accuracy of information and rms prot with respect to 
We observe that when the market size is greater, the optimal accuracy of informa-
tion and prot are higher. The e¤ect to the optimal accuracy of information keeps the
same. But when the market size is small, it has little e¤ects on the prot because its
limited e¤ect to the demand. But when the market size is greater, the prot of the
rm increases faster with it. It has greater positive e¤ect to the prot with the same
sales compared to small market size. The prot will be improved more e¤ectively. So
we have the observation below.
Observation The accuracy of the information and the prot of the rm increase
with the market size, and the prot increases faster when the market size is greater.
7.3.2 The impact of d
When kf = 0:5; ka = 1000;  = 100; optimal accuracy of information and the prot
with respect to d are
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Figure 21 Optimal accuracy of information and the prot with respect to d
Optimal accuracy of information increases with the disutility. When disutility
caused by mismatch to customer preference is higher, the rm needs to buy informa-
tion with higher accuracy to avoid the high disutility. She has to reduce the risk of
mismatch. Otherwise, the sale is expected too small with high probability. While the
prot decreases with the disutility. When the disutility becomes greater the rm bears
more risk to mismatch the customer preference, the demand is smaller and she collects
fewer prots. In conclusion, we have the observation below.
Observation When the disutility of mismatch to customer preference becomes
greater, the rm buys information with higher accuracy but gets a lower prot.
63
8 Comparing the two game models
In this section, we mainly compared di¤erent models and di¤erent ways the rm
chooses the design.
8.1 Comparing di¤erent models
Our research focuses on the way of market research and product design. The rm or
outside designers complete these two processes so there are four di¤erent scenarios of
combination. We considered the scenario when designers complete the two processes
and the scenario when the rm designs the product and does market research. When
 = 0:5 in our main model, the acquired information is useless for the rm. It means
designers design the product only and the rm has no information about customer
preference. In the benchmark model, the rm has information of customer preference
and designs the product herself. We want to study the performance of combination
of information and whether designers design the product. The prot of the rm when
outside designers design the product but the rm has no information is
Of = 0:5
k2f
2
E(Q) + d
2
8
E( 1
Q
)  d
2
g+ C12k(1  k)
[
4
E(Q) + d
2
16
E( 1
Q
)  d
4
] + (k2   2k)rw   2kra:
The prot of the rm when she has information and designs the product is
If =
(Q  (1  )d)2
4Q
  1
2
kfQ
2   1
2
ka(   0:5)2:
The prot of the rm when outside designers design the product and the rm has
information is
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Compare Of + 
I
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second model decreases with the cost factor kf : And the prot of the rst model is
stationary. When kf is too large the traditional rm gets little prot, then she should
choose the new way to avoid the large innovate cost and get more prots from the new
way.
As shown in gure 22 (q0 = 20; M = 2; r0 = 10; kf = 0:5; ka = 10), we have the
observation below.
Observation When the market size is large enough or the disutility is high enough,
the new business model dominates the benchmark business model. When both the
disutility and market size are small enough, the rm prefers the benchmark business
model. And the relative attractiveness of new business model versus benchmark model
keeps the same when the market size is small enough.
Fig 22 Two business models (e¤ects of disutility and market size)
We observe that both demands are large enough when the market size is large
enough. In the benchmark model, the rm takes more e¤ort to provide higher quality
with higher cost. However, in the new business model, the quality is provided by
outside designers. They determine the quality according to their private cost parameter
and this quality is not a¤ected by the market size. So when the market size is large
enough, the rm costs more in the benchmark. We also observe that the new business
model dominates the benchmark business model when the disutility is high enough.
Match customer preference is more important when the disutility is high enough. In the
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benchmark model, the rm needs to provide a higher quality and buy the information
with higher accuracy to counteract the negative e¤ect of high disutility. While in
the new business model, both quality and accuracy of the information are provided
by outside designers and they are not a¤ected by the disutility. So the new business
model has advantages when the market size is high enough or the disutility of customer
is high enough. When both the disutility and market size are small enough, the rm
prefers the benchmark business model. The relative attractiveness of new business
model versus benchmark model keeps the same when the market size is small enough.
It means the rm should not change the business model she used before. The benet
of outside designerscompetitive product design is limited, so does the rm. So both
business models cannot be better because of the limitation of the market size.
As shown in gure 21 (q0 = 15; M = 2; ka = 100; d = 2;  = 20), we have the
observation below.
Observation The impact of extra reward on relative attractiveness of new business
model versus benchmark model increases with extra reward. When the extra reward is
high enough, the rm always prefers the new business model.
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Fig 23 Two business models (e¤ects of extra reward and e¤ort cost)
When the extra reward is low enough, the designer whose design is picked by the
rm cannot gain enough benet from the participation. Then he hopes to receive
higher reward form the rm. When extra reward is smaller, the rm needs to pay
more to designers. And fewer designers participate because of the expected small extra
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reward. Then the rm receives less information about customer preference, expected
disutility is higher and the demand is lower. This would hurt the attractiveness of
new business model versus benchmark model. When the extra reward is high enough,
outside designers may receive enough reward from the participation. The rm gives no
rewards to them and still can attract enough designers to participate. That means the
rm has no cost for the information about customer preference and the quality of the
design. Even the cost of the rm in the benchmark model is zero, the attractiveness
of new business model versus benchmark model is high enough. So the new business
model has an advantage when the extra reward is high enough.
Next we investigate the di¤erent ways the rm chooses the design. The way when
the rm always chooses the design which combined the quality and customer preference
has been considered in section 5. We consider the way the rm only considers quality
or customer preference now.
8.2 Comparing di¤erent ways of choosing design
We consider two other ways the rm chooses the design similar with section 5.
8.2.1 Highest quality
Stage 3: Firms design choice When the rm receives na designs on attribute a
and m  na designs on attribute b; if the rm always chooses the design with highest
quality, the prot is
p 

1  E()d+ p
Q

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=   
Q
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Q  0:5d
Q

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We get the equilibrium price and corresponding prot
p(na;m  na; a) = Q  0:5d
2
;
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2
4Q
  rw  mra:
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Stage 2: Designersparticipation and quality decision
di
dQi
=  (rw + r0)(M   1)(1  g 1(Qi))M 2dg
 1(Qi)
dQi
 KiQi:
Set the rst-order derivative of the prot with respect to Qi equal to zero, Then we
have
QiQ
0
i=  (rw + r0)(M   1)
(1 Ki)
Ki
M 2
:
The equilibrium quality is
Qi =
vuutq20 + 2(rw + r0)(M   1)
"
M 2X
j=0
CjM 2((  k)j 1 ( Ki)j 1)
#
:
And k can be solved from the equation below
(rw + r0)(1  k)M 1   0:5kq20 + ra = 0:
Stage 1: Firms reward decision In the rst stage, the rm determines the re-
wards. We can get probability of the value of m
Pr(na + nb = m) = C
m
M
km(1  k)M m:
So the expected prot of the rm is
f=
M
m=1C
m
M
km(1  k)M mmna=0Cnam (0:5)mE[
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The expectations related with the quality are
E(Q) =
Z k
0
(1  (1 Ki)m)Qi dKi:
E(
1
Q
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Z k
0
(1  (1 Ki)m)
Qi
dKi:
We can easily nd that this scenario is the special case when  = 0:5 in section 5.
We conclude that the prot of the rm increases with the accuracy of the information
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in section 6.4. So the rm always gets a higher prot from the way choosing the
design combined quality and customer preference compared with the way choosing the
highest quality without consideration of customer preference.
8.2.2 Customer preference
Stage 3: Firms design choice The rm chooses the design with attribute a if
and only if na > 0:5m, the prot is
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We get the equilibrium price and corresponding prot
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We observe that the prot increases with the quality. So when the rm chooses a
design on attribute a she chooses the one with the highest quality. Similarly, she
chooses a design on attribute b if na < 0:5m, the prot is
p 
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The equilibrium price and corresponding prot are
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We observe that the prot increases with the quality too. So when the rm chooses a
design on attribute b she chooses the one with the highest quality.
We can conclude the prot of the rm is
f (na;m  na) =


Q  (1 )j2na mj
j2na mj+(1 )j2na mjd
2
4Q
  rw  mra:
Note that Q = Qa (when na > 0:5m) or Qb (when na < 0:5m):
Stage 2: Designersparticipation and quality decision When designer i de-
signs on attribute a; there are M   1 cases for other designers. There are na   1
designers design on attribute a and M   na designers design on attribute b:
na   1 nb Pr(design of designer i is picked)
0 M   1 0
::: ::: :::
na   1 M   na Cna 1M 1 (0:5)M 1(1  g 1(Qi))na 1
::: ::: :::
M   1 0 CM 1M 1(0:5)M 1(1  g 1(Qi))M 1
Table 6 Probabilities when the design of designer i is picked
So the probability when the design of designer i is picked to produce is
M 1X
na=0:5M
Cna 1M 1 (0:5)
M 1(1  g 1(Qi))na 1:
The prot of designer i is similar with the scenario when M = 2. To nd the equi-
librium quality of designer i, we calculate the rst-order derivative of the prot with
respect to Qi
di
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Set the rst-order derivative of the prot with respect to Qi equal zero, Then we have
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And k can be solved from the equation below
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Compare the equilibrium quality with the result in section 5.2, we observe that this
equilibrium quality is smaller.
Stage 1: Firms reward decision In the rst stage, the rm determines the re-
wards. We can get probability of the value of m
Pr(na + nb = m) = C
m
M
km(1  k)M m:
So the expected prot of the rm is
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The expectations related with the quality are
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Similarly, the prot is equal to or smaller than the prot in section 5.3. Next we
compare the prot under the way only considering the quality or customer preference.
Designers compete with a quality greater than otherM 1 designers(the way choosing
highest quality), and a quality greater than other na 1 (or nb 1) designers(the way
choosing customer preference). We observe that the equilibrium quality by choosing
the highest quality is always greater than the quality by choosing customer preference.
The expected disutility when the rm chooses customer preference is smaller. So when
the design chosen by customer preference happens to be the one with highest quality,
the rm gets a higher prot by choosing customer preference. The quality is much
greater than the disutility under our assumption. So when the design chosen by
customer preference is not the one with highest quality, the rm gets a higher prot
by choosing highest quality. We test many sets of parameters with di¤erent values of
disutility and show the result when  = 0:8 (or 1);  = 20; q0 = 10; M = 2; r0 = 10
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Fig 24 Three ways of choosing design ( = 0:8 or 1)
The left gure shows result when  = 0:8 and the right one shows result when
 = 1: We observe that when the disutility is low enough i.e. equals to zero, the
rm gets the same prot by choosing the design with three di¤erent ways. None
disutility means customer preference does not a¤ect the sales. Note that the accuracy
of information also has signicant e¤ects on prot. When there is disutility, we observe
that quality is always more important than customer preference when the information
accuracy is low enough. When the accuracy of information is low enough, the value
of the information is less important. The rm cannot get an accurate design with
customer preference because the information is not reliable. So the rm also prefers
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choosing highest quality. But when the accuracy of the information or the disutility is
high enough, the rm prefers choosing customer preference. Under this scenario, the
expected disutility is high. And the relative dominance increases with accuracy of the
information or the disutility.
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9 Summary
In this thesis, we investigate a new way that the rm does not take e¤orts to do
market research or design the product. Outside competitive designers develop the
product for the rm. The rm determines a reward to all participating designers and
another reward to the designer whose design is picked to attract designers to propose
their designs for the company. There are many designers who may participate and
compete with each other for the rewards. The designers determine whether or not to
begin a design according the rewards and their private cost. If they decide to design
then they should also consider the customer preference and decide to design on which
attribute. After designers submit their designs, the rm picks a design for production
and determines the price of the product. And only the corresponding designer whose
design is picked gets the reward. The customer decides whether or not to buy the
product. Another business way is the traditional way in the benchmark. The rm
determines to buy the information about customer preference with a suitable accuracy,
then decides to design on which attribute. Then the rm starts to produce the product
with a suitable quality and sets the price. At last customers actual preference with the
attribute is realized. Individual customer chooses whether or not to buy the product.
The rm produces to meet the demand. We plan to answer the following questions:
When should a rm choose this kind of new business model? What kind of reward
structure the rm provides? How do designers determine the quality of the design?
How does a rm choose the design?
By solving the game models, we answered the questions. We nd that when the
market size is large enough or the disutility is high enough, the new business model
dominates the benchmark business model. When both the disutility and market size
are small enough, the rm prefers the benchmark business model. And the relative
attractiveness of new business model versus benchmark model keeps the same when the
market size is small enough. The impact of extra reward on the relative attractiveness
of new business model versus benchmark model increases with extra reward. When
the extra reward is high enough, the rm always prefers the new business model.
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When there are more designers that participate, the rm gives lower rewards to
designers. When the market size becomes greater, the rm gives a higher reward to
the designer whose design is picked. While the reward given to all designers increases
with market size when it is low enough, and decreases when the market size is high
enough. When the benchmark quality is su¢ ciently high, the rewards decrease with
the benchmark quality. When the benchmark quality is su¢ ciently low, the rewards
increase with benchmark quality. When the accuracy of information becomes greater,
the rm always gives a higher reward to all designers who have participated. When the
accuracy of information is low enough, the rm gives a higher reward to the designer
whose design is picked, while giving a lower reward to him when the accuracy is high
enough. When the disutility of mismatches with customer preference becomes greater,
the rm gives a lower reward to all participated designers. When the disutility is low
enough, the reward given to the designer whose design is picked increases with the
disutility. But when the disutility is high enough, the reward given to the designer
whose design is picked decreases with the disutility. When the extra reward is higher,
the rm gives lower reward to the designer whose design is picked. However, the
reward given to all designers who have participated increases with the extra reward
rst, but then decreases.
A designer participates if and only if his cost parameter is less than k. When
the cost parameter is high enough i.e. greater than k, designers do not participate
because they cannot a¤ord a quality which is greater than benchmark quality. Under
this scenario, he cannot have a prot greater than the reservation utility. And they
can hardly get the only reward which is given to the designer whose design is picked
by the rm, so they prefer not waste their e¤ort. If a designer participates, each of
them determines the quality according to his private cost parameter without knowing
otherscost parameter because they cannot observe them. He submits a lower quality
when his cost parameter is higher, while he submits a higher quality with a lower
cost parameter. Each designer determines the quality according to the Pareto-optimal
equilibrium quality we obtained.
The rm chooses one design by comparing the prots of di¤erent choices. It always
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chooses the one which maximizes its prot. We nd that it always chooses the one
with the highest quality when there are two designers. If there are more than two, it
chooses the one with the highest quality when all designs are with the same attribute.
While some designers design with attribute a but some others design with attribute
b, the rm chooses the design with the highest quality with attribute a if the highest
quality of design with attribute b is low enough. Otherwise it chooses the design
with the highest quality with attribute b. That means both the quality and signals
of customer preference determine the choice of the rm. When the benet of high
quality is greater than the benets of the attribute with more signals, the rm chooses
the one with higher quality, while it may choose the one with a lower quality but
with more signals to match customer preference. When half designers design on each
attribute, the rm always chooses the design with the highest quality no matter what
the attribute is.
When the disutility is low enough, the rm prefers choosing the design with the
highest quality. Low disutility means the e¤ect of customer preference is minimal.
Quality is more important with low disutility. When the accuracy of information is low
enough, the value of the information is less important. The rm cannot get an accurate
design with customer preference because the information is not reliable. So the rm
also prefers choosing the highest quality. But when the accuracy of the information
or the disutility is high enough, the rm prefers choosing customer preference. Under
this scenario, the expected disutility is high. And the relative dominance increases
with the accuracy of the information or the disutility.
Operational parameters have signicant e¤ects on the decisions and the prots.
When there are more designers that participate, if all designs have the same attribute
the rm can charge a higher price; if there are designs with attributes a and b, then
the price is higher if the rm chooses the attribute chosen by most designers, while
the price is lower if the rm chooses the attribute chosen by least designers. The price
decreases with the benchmark quality when the benchmark quality is su¢ ciently high.
The price increases with benchmark quality when the benchmark quality is su¢ ciently
low. When the accuracy of information or the extra reward becomes greater, the rm
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charges a higher price, while when the disutility caused by mismatches with customer
preference becomes greater, the rm charges a lower price.
When there are more designers that participate, the rm gets a higher prot.
And the margin benet becomes smaller when there are enough designers. When the
market size becomes greater, the rm gets a higher prot. And the benet becomes
greater when the market size is greater enough. However, the prot of the rm al-
ways decreases with the benchmark quality and the disutility. When the accuracy of
information or extra reward is higher, the rm gets a higher prot.
The analysis and results of this thesis is suitable for vertical preference. Products
which can be divided into vertical preference can be applied by this model. For those
that can be divided into horizontal preference, we may analyze the model using hor-
izontal preference. This is one possible topic of our future research. Only a business
model like Threadlesss which combines market research with product design can be
applied by this model.
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